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The notion that students come to science courses with misconceptions has become quite widely accepted by those who follow or participate in education research. DiSessa and his colleagues (diSessa, 1988, 1993; Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1993) have challenged the theoretical and empirical validity of the misconceptions perspective and offered an alternative account of cognitive structure in "phenomenological primitives," or "p-prims." The purpose of this article is to further clarify and contrast the two accounts, in particular to consider their utility and generativity as conceptual tools for teachers; in other words, how might each perspective influence instructional perceptions and intentions? The article recounts a discussion about forces and motion from a high school physics class; analyzes how a teacher might perceive students' participation in that discussion from either perspective; and considers what, based on those perceptions, the teacher might see as tasks for instruction.